Talk:Israeli occupation of the West Bank/Archive 7

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Request for Comment

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section. A summary of the conclusions reached follows.

There is no consensus for inclusion of this material, but many of the objections are focused on 1) the inclusion of the material in the specific section on "Settler violence" (since it is about violence perpetrated by non-settlers) and 2) on the overall vagueness of the proposal, which mentions no specific text or sources. A new proposal that addresses these objections might get a different reaction. --RL0919 (talk) 22:58, 12 June 2019 (UTC)

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A question came to the fore whether or not the section "Settler violence" needs to be expanded with a short inclusion mentioning violence perpetrated by Palestinians against Israelis, so as to lend more balance to the section? Davidbena (talk) 21:04, 22 April 2019 (UTC)

• Support inclusion.Davidbena (talk) 21:04, 22 April 2019 (UTC)
• Oppose - The article is lacking in Palestinian responses to the occupation. Not much on either intifada, not much on post wall. That should be added. But that isnt the suggestion here. The suggestion here is that we must "balance" Israeli settler violence with speculation that the base motivation for it is Palestinian violence that precedes it. That is both factually wrong (price tag attacks for example are taken in response to Israeli actions, not Palestinian ones) and based on a complete misunderstanding of NPOV. We cover the topic, in that section violence by settlers, in a neutral way, meaning encompassing all the significant views found in reliable sources. We dont make some false balance by adding unrelated topics. We do need a section on Palestinian responses, including violent ones. But we do not need to make things up in the settler violence section to serve some false balance that the sources do not support. nableezy - 21:20, 22 April 2019 (UTC)
• Oppose inclusion on the grounds that Israeli settlers are separate from Israel and Palestine's macro-scale conflict. Furthermore, as I cannot find any relatively unbiased sources documenting violence against Israeli settlers in general, the inclusion of this section would be a needless violation of WP:UNDUE. Joel.Miles925 (talk) 18:07, 28 April 2019 (UTC) Support per discussion below. Joel.Miles925 (talk) 21:03, 28 April 2019 (UTC)

  It is actually quite easy to find sources on terror attacks, molotov cocktails, and stone throwing against settlers. Sources generally use "terror", not "violence".Icewhiz (talk) 18:21, 28 April 2019 (UTC)

  The only results pulled by a search on databases, certain newspapers listed at WP:FENS, and just standard google that I can find for "terror against israeli settlers" is about people in palestine being attacked by settlers. What are you using to get those sources? Joel.Miles925 (talk) 18:29, 28 April 2019 (UTC)

  gScholar terrorism settlements "West Bank" "West+Bank"&btnG=. "stone throwing" "West Bank" settlers "stone+throwing"++"West+Bank"+settlers&btnG=. Icewhiz (talk) 18:43, 28 April 2019 (UTC)

  I don't see anything here that indicates the bulk of the violence is not from the israeli side. My point still stands, as far as these particular links go. Joel.Miles925 (talk) 19:02, 28 April 2019 (UTC)

  I can pull statistics - but settler terror attacks result in 0 to a handful of fatalities per year in the past 20 years or so. Palestinian terror from the West Bank is an order of magnitude larger. Icewhiz (talk) 19:11, 28 April 2019 (UTC)

This is not about fatalities (Israeli settlers bear machine guns, are protected by omnipresent army units to which is delegated most of the killing, wounding and intimidation), against an unarmed population, over a decade down to 2014, settler violence against West Bankers averaged about 260 incidents per annum, an order of magnitude larger than P on S violence, restricting the word 'violence' to actual physical injury. Most scholarship treats adjunctive things, part of the daily order, like land theft, olive harvest theft etc, also as violent. It is hard to categorize sociologically because the statistics vary greatly according to how the sociologist defines violence here. Nishidani (talk) 19:42, 28 April 2019 (UTC)

Inclusion of information about Palestinian terror, unless it is against Israeli settlers, is just muddying the water. This section isn't about that, it's about violence by or against the Israeli settlers. As it stands, this section, from my point of view, represents what is happening regarding said settlers. Furthermore, per this UN article, said violence is on the rise. Hence, the section can be considered neutral as-is.

If you have statistics that give a good reason for inclusion of this section, then by all means send them. I'm willing to change my view here, I just haven't seen anything that gives me reason to yet. Joel.Miles925 (talk) 19:24, 28 April 2019 (UTC)

@Joel.Miles925: - on the rise, yeah (and getting some RECENTish attention as a result), but rising from close to zero to a bit more than that. I'll throw OCHAOPT (a highly biased source) right back at you. The title has "rise in Israeli fatalities". The body lists 3 Palestinian fatalities - 2 of which were carrying out stabbing attacks when they were killed. The body lists 7 fatalities under "Palestinian attacks on Israeli settlers and other Israeli civilians" (this statistic including all Israeli civilians killed inside the West Bank) stating "Despite the decline in the number of incidents, fatalities among Israeli settlers and other civilians increased in 2018: seven people were killed in the first ten months of 2018 compared with three in all of 2017. The latest fatal attack took place on 7 October, when a Palestinian man employed in the industrial area of Barkan settlement shot and killed an Israeli man and woman, also injuring another woman.". Further it suggests a cause and effect relationship: Some of the peaks in settler violence against Palestinians recorded this year occurred within two or three days immediately after the killing of Israeli settlers by Palestinians and were presumably in retaliation." - so the source you brought yourself - [1] - both shows that Palestinian violence against settlers is greater in magnitude that settler violence against Palestinians and that settler violence follows deadly attacks carried out by Palestinians against settlers.Icewhiz (talk) 19:54, 28 April 2019 (UTC)

@Icewhiz: - you do have a point there, however, the graph directly below the quote you pulled lists a total of 403 injuries due to Israeli settlers on the Palestinian side. Furthermore, the article also says that Palestinian attacks are on decline, with 33% fewer in 2018 than 2017. So perhaps a slight mention may be warranted here, but not in the section on settler violence. That is not what this section is about. It would also be nice if you could find another source (whatever you don't consider biased) that supports your POV. I'm starting to understand where you're coming from. Joel.Miles925 (talk) 20:05, 28 April 2019 (UTC)

OCHAOPT's mission is to assist Palestinian civilians - as such it generally does not cover Israeli civilians by definition (mainly doing so when relevant to reports on Palestinian civilians). The graph beneath is injuries - mainly minor, including tear gas inhalation. That something is "on the rise" is not reason for inclusion (see WP:RECENTISM) - we include per weight and absolute magnitude - as such OCHAOPT clearly shows that the fatality level today is higher for Israeli civilians (from Palestinian attacks) in the West Bank - and that it was much higher in the past in relation to Palestinian fatalities from settler atttacks. Furthermore it asserts that settler attacks are in retaliation to killings of settlers by Palestinians.Icewhiz (talk) 20:20, 28 April 2019 (UTC)

I cede my stance on this issue. There is too much coverage of the Palestinian violence to not have this section included. The first sources I found simply happened to not cover it, which is why I carried on with that discussion for as long as I did. Joel.Miles925 (talk) 21:02, 28 April 2019 (UTC)

Then you are not familiar with the OCHA documentation. Secondly you are manaipulating raw figures. The category "Palestinian vs settler violence" is generic. You cite data restricting 'violence' to incidents of physical harm, and then generalize that as covering all violence. That is statistical manipulation. The facts for the last three years are per OCHA

• 2017 105 incidents of settlers' violence against Palestinian property:52 P casualties
• 2018 207 incidents of settlers' violence against Palestinian property:73 P casualties
• 2019 81 incidents of settlers' violence against Palestinian property:34 P casualties.

Where's the order of magnitude? On the same page you can get their analysis of Israeli civilians. Check the numbers for casualties from IDF actions in the same period. Really, with that amount of high-intensity violence, it is rather remarkable that settlers need to do as much damsge as they do. Nishidani (talk) 20:30, 28 April 2019 (UTC)

• Generally yes, but proposal not specific - malformed RfC. Palestinian terror from the occupied West Bank (at settlers, IDF, and outside of the West Bank) is well covered in sources covering the occupation. However, this RfC is premature in that no concrete text and sources have been put forward.Icewhiz (talk) 18:48, 28 April 2019 (UTC)

I generally agree we need to cover Palestinian responses to the occupation, including violent ones. I think that however is its own section, not a part of settler violence. nableezy - 21:59, 28 April 2019 (UTC)

We have a full paragraph on that already, Nab.Nishidani (talk) 12:06, 29 April 2019 (UTC)

Not really imo. We barely cover either intifada, and it goes beyond armaments or the asymmetry in the warfare. I think a full section on Palestinian responses, non-violent and violent, would be fine to include as its own top level section. There is a bit in there about suicide attacks, but I think we should cover in a chronological manner the different phases that Palestinian resistance or whatever wording somebody wants to use has gone through. nableezy - 18:11, 29 April 2019 (UTC)

Well, remember a huge effort was made to gut this page on the pretext that it violated wiki length. Now that it's been radically pared down, some of the editors pushing for the crew-cut are suggesting expansion, with robust new sections. I suppose in the I/P area you can have things both ways unilaterally, since the reality is that what's good for the goose isn't good for the gander. One tries to lead a logically coherent life, or editing life. but that approach holds little water, or doesn't wash.Nishidani (talk) 20:07, 29 April 2019 (UTC)

Some of those who have argued for a reduction in size, have said all along that additional sections/materials should be added for aspects not covered at all by the present article and which are well covered in RSes. Icewhiz (talk) 20:07, 7 May 2019 (UTC)

Yes of course, some of those who have argued for a reduction in size have meant that for only material that their personal POV makes objectionable. For material that pushes their POV of course they feel otherwise. nableezy - 22:20, 7 May 2019 (UTC)

WP:NPA - please strike above. This article, as noted by many editors, omits information that is well covered in RSes and is WP:DUE for inclusion.Icewhiz (talk) 03:33, 8 May 2019 (UTC)

• Oppose, unless one can get solid non-governmental scholarly sources that provide an overview and preferably statistics specific to violent Palestinian incidents against settlers, and vice versa. That indeed would be important.Nishidani (talk) 19:42, 28 April 2019 (UTC)
• Oppose, I agree, completely. Activist (talk) 08:04, 30 April 2019 (UTC)
• Support with WP:RSOURCING.E.M.Gregory (talk) 21:25, 28 April 2019 (UTC)
• Oppose the section especially says "Settler violence" if there are sources that state violence against settlers it should not be in that section since Palestinians are not the settlers. It can be in another section and that's to avoid the POV and the SYNTH whispered conclusion which gives legitimacy to settlers violence. I think it would fix the balance issue if there is another section.--SharabSalam (talk) 08:35, 30 April 2019 (UTC)
• Support per the Joel Miles/Icewhiz discussion above and sources therein. Although, this is a general support for inclusion; the devil will be in the details of actual language. Leviv ich 19:54, 7 May 2019 (UTC)
• Oppose, resisting occupation is legitimate, Huldra (talk) 22:31, 7 May 2019 (UTC)

This vote should be disregarded per WP:NOTFORUM. Wikieditor19920 (talk) 19:16, 9 May 2019 (UTC)

The legal rules for opposing occupation of the West Bank vs occupying the West Bank are different, and should be acknowledged. Besides that, we would of course need proper sourcing, as has been pointed out. (And no, an Israeli Ministry is not a proper source in this case), Huldra (talk) 21:28, 10 May 2019 (UTC)

• (Summoned by bot) Oppose, in the absence of convincing evidence from the OP or anyone supporting the proposal. That Palestinian responses to settlers should be covered is obvious; but there's nothing here to suggest it be covered additionally in the settler violence section. Vanamonde (Talk) 04:55, 9 May 2019 (UTC)
• Support To the extent that it stays on-topic within the section, i.e. if the sources describe Palestinian violence as a direct response. Wikieditor19920 (talk) 19:16, 9 May 2019 (UTC)
• weak Support - Generally, we need to show both sides if based on proper WP:RS. But I agree with Icewhiz that this RfC is too vague. It would be helpful, if we had some sources in hand and knew what exactly would be added to create balance so we are not commenting on this WP:POV and WP:DUE issue in a vacuum.--Darryl Kerrigan (talk) 18:13, 12 May 2019 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

"Campus"

This discussion is copied from my user talk:

'on campus' means in any university campus, as per standard usage. As to what part of the text it summarized, it summarized the main article at the top of the first section [2], which perhaps needs to be tweaked to mention, what was originally in the text until shifted to the main art5icle, that talking about Palestinian issues on campus is controversial. I'd appreciate it if you considered reverting.- Thanks Nishidani (talk) 16:37, 7 August 2019 (UTC)

@Nishidani: "campus" can actually mean any number of things. A company's headquarters or production site can be referred to as a "campus". Grounds of religious institutions are sometimes described as a "campus". At the very least this is very bad writing. If it's a university campus then WHICH university is being referred to? Some American university? Some Israeli university? Palestinian? British? Fijian? And if it's, say, American university, again, WHICH one? University of Alabama? Harvard? Appalachian West-Central Community College? The sentence is just confusing in there.

And it doesn't actually summarize that section. There isn't anything in that section about education or campuses.Volunteer Marek (talk) 23:42, 7 August 2019 (UTC)

Contextually there was no ambiguity. The text was written based on English usage, not North American usage. In English usage campus overwhelmingly refers to ‘The grounds and buildings of a university or college,’ a sense widely shared and clarified by context in NAmerica. See Campus Watch, and Campus.

Your second point was correct. Could I suggest that in a page subject to edit-warring where gutting the article is a priority for some, any concerns be set forth on the talk page. It took just a minute to readjust the section to include that missing matter, that had been transferred to the main sister article in scaling back the length of the page, so that the lead phrasing you removed reflected material further down the page. Thanks Nishidani (talk) 06:56, 8 August 2019 (UTC)

The original text was badly written and just kind of didn't make any sense. I'm not so sure the present text is any better. Currently it says:

The domain of public discussion is also subject to debate, with some organizations saying that pro-Israeli Jewish students are subject to vilification and harassment on university campuses,[16] while others note that proposed talks on campus concerning Palestinian issues can be rescinded for fears that audiences might not be able to objectively evaluate the material. Attempts have been made to silence several high-profile critics of Israeli policies in the territories,[17] giving rise to anxieties that the topic itself is at risk, and that the political pressures circumscribing research and discussion undermine academic freedom.[

Here is the thing. The above paragraph is actually NOT abut "Israeli occupation of the West Bank". It's about the discourse about the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Now, obviously, the conversation about topic X, is relevant to topic X. But this is being given way WP:UNDUE prominence in the lede, especially since until recently this was hardly covered in the main body of the article. Even now it's a very minor part of it. This seems more like trying to include an airing of grievances way up top where every reader will see it, rather than actually writing an encyclopedia article on the topic.

Removing it again.Volunteer Marek (talk) 10:13, 11 August 2019 (UTC)

Discourse about the Israeli occupation is covered in the first section, which is an extreme synthesis of the main page linked in that section. To state that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank is one thing, and that discussion itself of it abroad arouses significant controversy another thing, unrelated to the former, is, frankly, an untenable position. One of the outstanding features of the occupation is the immense effort put on suppressing recognition of it asa an occupation. I've adjusted the text again. As below. I can see no warrant for challenging something whose relevance has been recognized ands stable on this for 1 year and 9 months.

Public discussion of the occupation is also contested in certain venues, with some organizations saying that pro-Israeli Jewish students are subject to vilification and harassment on university campuses,[16] while others note that proposed talks on campus concerning Palestinian issues can be rescinded for fears that audiences might not be able to objectively evaluate the material. Attempts have been made to silence several high-profile critics of Israeli policies in the territories,[17] giving rise to anxieties that the topic itself is at risk, and that the political pressures circumscribing research and discussion undermine academic freedom.Nishidani (talk) 11:29, 11 August 2019 (UTC)

Saw this on my watchlist, and I agree with Nishidani (how often does that happen? Including the edit summary in diff - which reminds me of edits Volunteer Marek has been making elsewhere) - full fledged academic books have been written about this - e.g. Anti-Zionism on Campus: The University, Free Speech, and BDS (Indiana University Press) and this deserves a short mention in the lead. There may be merit in condensing the two long sentences to one medium length sentence - but it shouldn't be removed outright. Icewhiz (talk) 14:12, 12 August 2019 (UTC)

Thanks Icewhiz. Yes, I myself, looking back over this, think it should be condensed. I'm busy offwiki but will see to it within the next two days. On the other hand, Marek did, despite the quibbling over campus, highlight something that escaped my attention. So, while somewhat annoyed by plain revert instead of tweaking suggestions, I should thank him as well.Nishidani (talk) 17:20, 12 August 2019 (UTC)

Icewhiz. Your proposal is, inadventently perhaps, comical. You paraphrase remarks about the repression of debate on the occupation by a succinct ref to some 'lively debates'. The point of sources is that debate itself is often strongarmed and strangled. Secondly 'Lively debates on the occupation in university campuses' suggests that the occupation of the campus is itself an object of 'lively' dispute. Nishidani (talk) 09:05, 13 August 2019 (UTC)

Those claiming to be silenced are implicitly indicating strongarm tactics of some sort or another. I hope that diff rectifies the possible confusion between the occupation of the West bank and campus occupation. Icewhiz (talk) 11:07, 13 August 2019 (UTC)

Three successive drafting errors suggest to me you might drop revising it. The following is not only nonsense, but doesn't appear to reflect the several sources it is supposed to be based on. I gather you just tried to rephrase what I had summarized, without checking them. In any case, I'll parse what you're doing in case it is not clear what the problem is.

On university campuses lively debates on the West Bank occupation have led to claims by Israeli critics that they've been silenced,

The fact that university campuses hold lively discussions about the WB occupation has generated assertions by critics of Israel that they have been silenced.

I.e. this is a classic non-sequitur. If debates exist on campus, then critics can hardly complain they have been silenced there. Though a non-sequitur, it does suggest that the critics are being stupid, since they talk on campus, and then deny they talked on campus in those 'lively debates'.

Don't try to refix, the refix of the fix. It's just getting messier at every turn. I'll do it one of these days.Nishidani (talk) 21:15, 13 August 2019 (UTC)

ICC

the rapport of the ICC wasn't about describing the legal framework on the west bank but rather about the security barrier, which is totatly different. There never was a process to define the legal status of the west bank in the icc, it simply not true. ( the legal opinion is not a ruling in itself )--Mardochez (talk) 09:03, 31 May 2020 (UTC)

Israel several reasons

start by the absence of borders or peace with the population of this territory, more sound than jewish importance, in fact it has never been proposede like, except in the news, while the formal israeli position is " to be negociated" --Mardochez (talk) 09:05, 31 May 2020 (UTC)

historical and legal problem with "Israel has established numerous Israeli settlements"

It is true israel recognize settlement, but does israel establish them? this is controversial and can be argued otherwise. historically, the first settlements were part of gush emunim ambitions and other ones were established by private individuals, (and authorized by state ). It's really ambiguous, therefore it is an incorrect assertion ( which has legal implications and should not be taken that easily, it's bias )--Mardochez (talk) 09:11, 31 May 2020 (UTC)

void accusations on Collective punishment

"Collective punishment

Israel's use of collective punishment measures, such as movement restrictions, shelling of residential areas, mass arrests, and the destruction of public health infrastructure.[bg] violates Articles 33 and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.[225] Article 33 reads in part:"

well you ignore the fact that there is many legal opinion that disagree with that assumption.

movement restrictions, well, this is a security measure during period of violence, and has nothing to do with " collective punishment", I don't see what checkpoint is not essential for security? can you tell?

shelling of residential areas, ...Of west bank??? In gaza it's shelling hamas infrastructure, sometimes inside "residential areas". no proof of voluntary bombing on civilians.

mass arrests, well there is no evidence of mas arrest of people unrelated to a crime or to violation of law.

and the destruction of public health infrastructure : evidences? gaza war is a war and fall inside the frame of " collateral dammage" but still which public health infrastructure was destroyed??? While israel actually promote health condition that have dramatically improved since 1967... also, is this article about gaza war???

In the section, stop presenting opinions as irrefutable facts!--Mardochez (talk) 09:20, 31 May 2020 (UTC)

jewish violence but no arab violence

Well the arab violence is often deadly, and often target civilians, but you should not to mention it, for unknown reasons--Mardochez (talk) 09:30, 31 May 2020 (UTC)

@Mardochez: That's not correct. Arab violence is mentioned. See Israeli occupation of the West Bank#Armaments (Palestinians). —Naddruf (talk ~ contribs) 17:08, 13 August 2020 (UTC)

It is totally unacceptable that I have to pay to see the sources of the article

Take for example this claim, made in "Military-Civil Administration" from the Conquest section:

"The military closely supervised elections in local clubs, cooperatives or charitable organizations. West Bank lawyers were banned on security grounds from organizing professionally a bar association."

The source ostensibly cited as a proof leads to here - And no, no mention of banning West Bank lawyers is done in the Preview there which everyone has access to. So one has to pay in order to find if a piece of information from Wikipedia is correct. Am I right? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 37.60.47.152 (talk) 22:21, 13 October 2020 (UTC)

There is no rule on Wikipedia that all sources must be available on the net! Indeed, most books and scholarly articles are not. And the article in quesition should be available at your local library, Huldra (talk) 22:28, 13 October 2020 (UTC)

Not all people have access to libraries, and not all libraries have access to these articles. Writing such accusations against one side, in relation to such a sensitive and politically controversial conflict, should be backed up by sources that are immediately available to all. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 37.60.47.152 (talk) 22:42, 13 October 2020 (UTC)

To editor 37.60.47.152: Your idea would remove from Wikipedia a large fraction of the most reliable sources, so it will never be accepted. Moreover, there is no need for your concern since you can ask for the source at WP:REX and it will be provided almost immediately unless it is very obscure. Journal articles like the one you mention are usually provided in less than one day. Zero^talk 02:42, 14 October 2020 (UTC)

Avoiding awkward wording

Under the "taxation" subsection, there is the phrase "The value of the goods confiscated bore no relation to the value of the goods confiscated", which is a contradiction. In line with the original source, I propose replacing that exact text with "The value of the goods confiscated bore no relation to the taxes being imposed", to reflect what was in the original journal article. NegaNote (talk) 23:56, 8 December 2020 (UTC)

 Done RudolfRed (talk) 02:39, 9 December 2020 (UTC)

Changes to the "Conquest" section

I'd like to discuss the changes I made to the "Conquest" section on 11 December, which Sakiv reverted with the summary "POV." I don't think any of these changes violated NPOV. My reasoning behind the primary two changes at the top of the section:

Palestine remains the only Arab land which has been denied Arab rule and independent statehood. This doesn't seem relevant to the section and is factually incorrect given the situation in Western Sahara.

That Zionism thought of partition agreements as temporary and aspired from the outset to incorporate all of Palestine into a Jewish state went back at least to declarations of intent made by Ben-Gurion in 1937-1938. Not all Zionists thought this, and Ben-Gurion was out of power in 1967. His views from 30 years prior would seem to be far less important in this context than those of Eshkol or Dayan. If reliable sources can be found confirming they also thought of partitions as temporary and always aspired to conquer the West Bank, then by all means, we should include those.

Finally, I added some wikilinks (e.g. to the Samu incident and made some wording changes I thought would improve the flow and clarity of the section (e.g. changing "Before the war ended" to "During the war"). Hopefully we can agree to restore those. PrimaPrime (talk) 17:31, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

We go by sources which state the generalization as written. Western Sahara does not fit the bill, since thought Arab/Berber two independent Arab countries at least claim sovereignty over it. It is clearly relevant to the section.

Like any movement dissident voices exist but the dominoes of the period, whose decisions would consistently guide policy, Ben-Gurion and Chaim Weizmann, stated what most knew anyway, that partition was a temporary expedient, and this pragmatic incrementalism, so deftly illustrated by the debates of 1947, confirms the point. One can remodulate the sentence so that Zionism is not the subject of 'thought' .Nishidani (talk) 19:00, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

The source provided for the first sentence is from 1971, when Spain still controlled the territory in question, so it seems Mr. Galtung was simply mistaken in his generalization. And as a generalization, it doesn't seem relevant in a section specifically about the immediate aftermath of 1967. Lots of groups lack self-rule and independent statehood, but of course Wikipedia is not for righting great wrongs.

As for the second part, again, by 1967 Ben-Gurion was retired, Weizmann was dead, and Israeli leaders were perhaps limited by the realities of statehood in a way they weren't in 1947. This is not an article about the 1947 partition plan or the 1947-1949 war. What would be relevant in this section is the thinking of Eshkol, Dayan, and others who were actually in a position to enact a grand partition-free vision, unless you want to claim that Ben-Gurion was still micromanaging the war effort from behind the scenes.

One could just as easily argue there weren't advance designs on the West Bank seeing as Eshkol passed a message to Hussein on the morning of 5 June, telling him Israel wouldn't attack if he stayed out of the conflict. And while foreign minister Eban famously referred to the Green Line as the "Auschwitz borders," suggesting a pre-existing desire to take the West Bank, he also vocally supported returning land for peace, so his thinking on the matter was evidently strategic and not rooted in ideological ambitions.

Altogether I think including this sort of debate would be far more relevant to the context of 1967 and the occupation that began there, rather than relying on old statements from a retired politician to implicate all of Zionism in a plot against the West Bank. I've updated the sentence accordingly per your suggestion and hope we can discuss what I've proposed above. PrimaPrime (talk) 14:23, 19 December 2020 (UTC)

If I could correct sources that I think misreport the facts, I'd have a marvelous time here. But one cannot, unless a reliable secondary source challenges the view given. The rest of your remarks consists of a very dubious qua partial, selective spin of a very complex history. Israel made no offer to give back the West Bank in 1967. Several scholars have pulled that meme to pieces, as you should know. Nishidani (talk) 18:42, 19 December 2020 (UTC)

The original quote is: "From an Arab point of view, the absence of such an interlude must have reinforced the image of Israel as a successor to British imperialism. Due to this succession, Palestine was the only Arab land denied Arab rule and denied independent statehood." So I apologize for calling Mr. Galtung mistaken; he was actually paraphrasing "an Arab point of view," and whoever wrote the sentence in question turned it into "Palestine remains the only Arab land which has been denied Arab rule and independent statehood," violating NPOV by stating opinion in wikivoice. The sentence doesn't belong in the article at all in its current state, and certainly not in a section specifically about the immediate events of 1967.

As for the argument I presented, yes, of course it's a very selective take on a very complex history. That's why it should be given due weight in the section based on the balance of reliable sources. In a cabinet debate after the war about what to do with the West Bank, some loudly opposed its cession (Begin: "As for the eastern Land of Israel, we must not return an inch of land"), some were equivocal (Dayan: "The West Bank is not Hussein...I wouldn’t recommend something that would mean settling in the area") and some correctly warned that Israel couldn't have it both ways forever (Eshkol: "One thing is clear to me: I don’t want more land and I don’t want more Arabs") Certainly this material would better establish the views of Israeli leaders toward the West Bank at the actual time of its conquest, as opposed to exclusively relying on Ben-Gurion's writings from three decades prior. PrimaPrime (talk) 01:16, 20 December 2020 (UTC)

You may want to read this article. It is well-known that the hawkish Israeli establishment was not satisfied with the 1949 borders and were seeking an opportunity to "finish what was started in 1948" so to speak. ImTheIP (talk) 04:07, 20 December 2020 (UTC)

I thought some more and I don't think "Johan Galtung states that the Arabs consider Palestine to be the only Arab land which has been denied Arab rule and independent statehood." belongs in the section. It should be focused more on what led to the occupation. ImTheIP (talk) 02:52, 21 December 2020 (UTC)

Neither do I feel happy about it, since attribution suggests only one person held that view, which I doubt. The generalization is just. All generalizations can be contested by pettifogging, as here. It is obvious that Palestine was an exception in the decolonization of the Arab world.Nishidani (talk) 07:36, 21 December 2020 (UTC)

Good we can agree on that; as for the article you linked, it notes that "...before June 1967, the idea of extending the borders seems to have been confined in Israel to two clearly identified political movements...even taken together, these two movements remained a minority," and "Of course, the 'planning' department of a general staff is meant to meet all possible situations, from the most obvious to the most unlikely." In other words, the IDF preparing to take the West Bank for strategic reasons in the event of a war was not the same thing as the majority of the political leadership having Zionist/ideological aspirations upon the territory. I think it would pretty simple to have the article reflect both Begin's maximalist delusions as well as Prime Minister Eshkol's stated opposition to "more land." PrimaPrime (talk) 04:36, 21 December 2020 (UTC)

The article has been severely truncated to satisfy the rage of a character later permabanned. What you are asserting is an impression based on very few sources, from which you make large generalizations. The contrary could be argued with extensive documentation. We shouldn't therefore be expanding on minutiae when so much more substance has already been excised. There are sister articles for that. Nishidani (talk) 07:36, 21 December 2020 (UTC)

They are referring to the article I linked to. PrimaPrime, the point isn't whether most Israeli politicians was in favor of capturing the West Bank. Of course they weren't, or at least they couldn't say that they were because conquering enemy territory is generally frowned upon. The point is that the Israeli hawkish establishment wanted to conquer the West Bank and they also made extensive plans in the eventuality of an opportunity arising. They got their will through and that is why the West Bank was and still is occupied. ImTheIP (talk) 14:15, 21 December 2020 (UTC)

If the majority weren't in favour of capturing the West Bank, then the hawks weren't the establishment, and this fact should be noted in the article. PrimaPrime (talk) 15:34, 21 December 2020 (UTC)

Currently, one source (Slater, quoting Ben-Gurion) is used in order to make a similarly large generalization about Israeli motives. If space is at a premium, then surely the contemporaneous minutes of a private meeting of top officials would better establish those motives than writings from many years before the conquest the section ostensibly describes. PrimaPrime (talk) 15:34, 21 December 2020 (UTC)

https://www.jns.org/opinion/the-allon-plan-then-and-now/ "In accordance with the concepts of what came to be known as the “Allon Plan,” the 1967-1977 Labor governments established 21 Jewish communities along the Jordan Valley and eastern slopes of Samaria during that period." Of course they wanted the land, it's very clear. And they took it and have been taking it ever since.Selfstudier (talk) 16:06, 21 December 2020 (UTC)

Chap 9 Expanding Israel's Borders makes it clear that plans were developed well before Eshkol for "security reasons", that well-known shopworn expression used as the pretext for pretty much anything nowadays.Selfstudier (talk) 19:24, 21 December 2020 (UTC)

None of this quite addresses my point about the immediate events of 1967, which is the topic of the section. In the hope of moving this process along, here's my proposed text:

Before the Six-Day War, there was an unwritten agreement between Israel and Jordan to uphold the neutrality of their border along the Green Line. According to King Hussein, this tacit accord was broken when Israel retaliated against Syrian-backed guerrilla infiltrations and sabotage with an assault on Samu in the southern West Bank on 13 November 1966.

The Israeli military planned to capture the West Bank in the event of a war, ostensibly for security reasons, while a minority of Zionists continued to regard the partition established by the 1949 Armistice Agreements as temporary and sought to incorporate the West Bank into Israel.

After the outbreak of the war with an Israeli strike on Egyptian airfields on the morning of 5 June 1967, Jordan shelled Israeli targets in West Jerusalem and elsewhere along the border. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol passed a message to Hussein saying Israel would not attack him if he stopped, but Hussein countered that it was too late and bombed Israeli air bases, as well as Netanya. This revived "irredentist aspirations on the Israeli side," which subsequently conquered East Jerusalem and, after news that Hussein had ordered a full retreat, took the entire West Bank by noon on 8 June.

The variety of Israeli attitudes toward the territory post-war are already explained in good detail further down so I agree they don't also need to be elaborated upon here. PrimaPrime (talk) 04:11, 22 December 2020 (UTC)

Pappé writes:

The Israeli political and military elite regarded the 1948 war as a missed opportunity: a historical moment in which Israeli could have occupied the whole of historical Palestine (from the river Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea). The only reason they did not do it was because of a tacit agreement with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: in return for Jordan’s limited participation in the general Arab war effort, Jordan would be allowed to annex the West Bank. Following 1948, the Israeli elite were looking for an opportunity and planned carefully from the mid-1960s how to implement a plan to have it all. There were several historical junctures in which the Israelis nearly did it – but held back at the last moment. The most famous instances were in 1958 and 1960. In 1958, the leader of the state and its first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, aborted plans at the last moment due to fears of international reaction. In 1960, Ben-Gurion held back because of his demographic fears –thinking that Israel cannot incorporate such a large number of Palestinians. The best opportunity came in 1967, regardless of the Israeli mythology of not wishing to go to war against Jordan, but being forced to react to Jordanian aggression. There was no need for Israel to remain in the West Bank, if this were just another round of tension between the two states. Incorporating the West Bank and the Gaza Strip within Israel was an Israeli plan since 1948 that was implemented in 1967.

ImTheIP (talk) 05:43, 22 December 2020 (UTC)

We can certainly attribute that view to Pappé. PrimaPrime (talk) 07:16, 22 December 2020 (UTC)

Your proposed text is unacceptable. You are trying to make out that Ben-Gurion was an anomaly and that, 'hey, we just captured the historic core of Judaism, the West Bank. We've no idea what we must do with this embarrassing predicament. Heck, damn. . .'

ridiculous premise. From Herzl onwards, not saying what Zionism's actually implementation required structurally, the spiriting out of the country of the Arab majority, using 'discretion and circumspection' in not alluding publicly to this obvious intention, was understood. The various Population Transfer Committees' planning from the early 1940s underline this - it is all over the diaries and remarks of people as varied as Eliyahu Dobkin,Shlomo Lavi, Eliezer Kaplan, Yosef Weitz, Moshe Shertok, Avraham Katznelson etc. As Nur Masahla cites:

The basis of Zionism is that the land of Israel is ours and not the land of the Arabs and not because they have large territories, and we have but little. We demand Palestine because it is our country' Rabbi Meir Berlin Nur Masalha 1992:p.79

When the West Bank fell into Israel's possession, that tradition found the ideal conditions for completing, enacting what was the core premise of the movement itself and this was and remains the majority sentiment.Nishidani (talk) 10:39, 22 December 2020 (UTC)

48/9 to 67 in Israel is not covered in much detail in WP (Arab–Israeli_conflict#1949–1967 and Israel#Early_years_of_the_State_of_Israel, is there anything else? It seems to me we are trying to write elements of that into this article when usually we would just have a very broad outline and wikilinks out for more info. I think we should not be writing too much about pre 67 (eg about views held by "some Zionists" or "tacit agreements") in this particular article, intended to be about the occupation 67 on.Selfstudier (talk) 11:45, 22 December 2020 (UTC)

Very few articles in this area get the attention they need. Look at Transfer Committee: the whole history preceding 1948 is virtually ignored. And this goes, as you say for those other articles. Just as I split off large sections of this for sister articles. The idea that Ben-Gurion's thinking was exceptional ('some Zionists') is silly, in any case, and, as you say, this section is an overview (one could expand the point raised with massive sourcing details for example), of pre-1967. There are many articles where this kind of issue could be thrashed out.Nishidani (talk) 12:10, 22 December 2020 (UTC)

We could move the debate on Zionist objectives to Origins of the Six-Day War, link there, and begin the section here on 5 June. And no, I don't think Ben-Gurion's thinking was exceptional, but Eshkol's is far more relevant to the events of 1967. PrimaPrime (talk) 12:33, 22 December 2020 (UTC)

I don't really agree with your interpretation. You do need some kind of lead in to 67 although I think it ought to be precised or copied from some other article rather than reinventing the wheel. In any case the Israeli Security concerns section tells anyone most of what they need to know about Israeli intentions, no land for peace, draw your own conclusions.Selfstudier (talk) 13:29, 22 December 2020 (UTC)

Never copy from other wiki articles. Very few have been edited scrupulously and anything we write up should start from scratc h every time, after consulting a dozen or so sources, even if one doesn't use them all. Whatever. By the way several remarks above -why Eshkol who died soon after is important I don't know, after all he instructed Israel's cartography office to erase from all future maps indications of the 1949 armistice lines and mandatory borders, and to print just 'Israel' on all the conquered territory, as well as Eban's notoriously misleading public statements - suggest to me you may be unfamiliar with analyses like that of Avi Raz, 'The Generous Peace Offer that was Never Offered,' Diplomatic History 37:1 January 2013), pp.85-108. The other article's a mess. I personally haven't time for any of this for the next few weeks, but by all means . . .Nishidani (talk) 13:44, 22 December 2020 (UTC)

I wasn't suggesting we copy indiscriminately, it's OK with attribution (required anyway) and personally I would check before I did it. If needs be redo the material in the other article then copy/summarize it. And you are right, the other article is a mess.Selfstudier (talk) 14:20, 22 December 2020 (UTC)

I dont actually really like the line Palestine remains the only Arab land which has been denied Arab rule and independent statehood. Doesnt strike me as a way to introduce whats covered there and it reads more argumentative than dispassionate. nableezy - 22:57, 7 March 2021 (UTC)

suggestions

I think there is too much emphasis on what I feel is peripheral, namely "language of conflict" and effect on academia. And too little on Palestinian responses, namely both intifidas, and more recently BDS. The article is still a bit unwieldy, but I think much of the first section can be pared down, and there is still room for cutting down some of the other sections and adding material on Palestinian responses. nableezy - 22:56, 7 March 2021 (UTC)

These are already spinoff articles and most of that information is present in those. I would disagree with substantially fleshing out either, though a short section with blue links to both below might be helpful. Wikieditor19920 (talk) 16:57, 8 March 2021 (UTC)

what is that even a response to? nableezy - 17:22, 8 March 2021 (UTC)

The most characteristic thing about the conflict since 1967 esp. is the vast gap between narrative languages: a normal reality of (a) belligerent occupying power and (b) occupied people has been recast, overwhelmingly with the complicity of the Western press, into Israel's POV, that this is a conflict between two peoples (clash of national aspirations), disputed territorial claims (we never say that of other similar cases), competing rights (as if an occupier had rights balancing those of the occupied); the anti-Semitic cast of criticism of such policies vs. the call for international law to be honoured etc.etc.etc. Since all sources either reflect these different approaches, the language section and media conflict is a prefatory requisite. It's already been hacked down beyond what was reasonable because of the permabanned chap and co's, nagging. I can't see that problem.

As to the others, we can expand them, but surely not by some sense that if something goes in, then something else must be taken out. That's the bozo's old MOS too long complaint and was always (there are many other historical overview articles longer than this).Nishidani (talk) 18:12, 8 March 2021 (UTC)

I just dont think the language of the conflict or the struggles of academics or students in Europe or the US deserve that kind of attention. Like if I were to put a hierarchy of things of importance in relation to this topic, academic freedom of professors in the west or the trials and tribulations of students in the US is so far down the list that I cant see how it is given this kind of attention in the lead and in the article. A brief note about the terminology and why it is disputed sure. But we focus as much on anti-semitism against pro-Israel students and issues professors face from think tanks trying to stifle their research as we do on the entirety of the first intifida. I just dont think those things matter nearly as much. nableezy - 18:18, 8 March 2021 (UTC)

Writing up the meta-evidence for the way the conflict is 'framed' is crucial, and not a matter of some academic hot-house or student demos. In this conflict, virtually all public reportage in what we take to be strong RS is subject to scholarly analysis for bias. If the sourcing itself is, for that reason, problematized in the literature, then the article cannot be written unless the readership is duly averted to the controversies over all of the terminology subsequently employed. Israel's chosen term 'administrative detention', for example, is defined as 'arbitrary arrest and imprisonment with' by numerous sources. One is a euphemism, the other a definition. You think the emphasis is exaggerated only because the text as it stands gives less focus proportionately on the devastations of the Ist Intifada. Well, just expand the latter section (I haven't compared the first version's treatment of that intifada, but it would be worthwhile examining how the revision cut it down).Nishidani (talk) 10:47, 9 March 2021 (UTC)

"into Israel's POV, that this is a conflict between two peoples (clash of national aspirations)" While I would agree that the Western press has been propagating Israel's views for decades, the national aspirations of Israel can not be ignored. If the article on Greater Israel is reliable, Israeli irredentism aims at the full annexation of the Palestinian territories. Dimadick (talk) 10:16, 9 March 2021 (UTC)

Well, I don't think I suggested they be ignored. My point was that its national aspirations, (achieved in 1948) are presented as being in conflict with those of the Palestinians (never achieved (and in my view never will be, but that is neither here nor there)). This inflects the narratives as endlessly repeated in the press. Palestinian aspirations affect Israel's security, Israel's soi-disant legitimate aspirations in one version concern large parts of the West Bank to which it has a claim as equally forceful as those promoted by Palestinians (and underscored by international law). I can't see where we are differing here.Nishidani (talk) 10:47, 9 March 2021 (UTC)

First Intifada

The Intifada material, Nableezy seems to be arguing, doesn't have a self-standing section. It is covered under other headings i.e.

Original version (A)

The mainstay of Palestinian resistance techniques to the occupation during the First Intifada, which was generally non-lethal, consisted of throwing stones during clashes with at Israeli troops, or at military and settler vehicles bearing their distinctive yellow number plates, together with tire-burning, hurling Molotov cocktails and setting up roadblocks. The then Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s policy was that, 'rioters must emerge with casualties or scars.' The juxtaposition of this primitive method with Israeli power was striking, with children and youths throwing stones and deploying slingshots against a fully-equipped and highly trained military power exerting 'incredible superiority'.

The military rules of engagement in the First Intifada were soon loosened to allow to be targeted for shooting stone-or Molotov throwers (or people suspecting of carrying them), youths masking their faces with keffiyeh, those building roadblocks, fleeing suspects, or anyone refusing to obey an order to halt. Israel prevented hospitals from reported statistics in the West Bank but roughly 90% of the 271 minors (16 and under) shot dead by Israeli forces between 9 December 1987 and 31 December 1993 were not throwing stones when shot, half were not taking part in clashes, 19 were executed by mista'arvim at close range for simply writing graffiti or for being masked, and 44 were denied medical treatment while lying mortally wounded.

The disparity between Israel's military, economic and technological might and relatively unarmed Palestinians, though overwhelming, has its defenders.. This specific tactic was addressed by Military Order No. 1108 which foresaw up to 20 years imprisonment for those condemned in a military court for this offense. Bail for young children arrested for throwing stones was $400-500 (1988) and if the offense was repeated, the money was forfeited and the child could be placed in administrative detention for a year. The parents of children under 12 years of age could be imprisoned as punishment for their child’s offense. Writing graffiti, an act vigorously censored by the military authorities, was also an important instrument for contesting the occupation.

Present version(B):

The mainstay of Palestinian armed resistance techniques to the occupation during the First Intifada, which was generally non-lethal, consisted of throwing stones during clashes with at Israeli troops, or at military and settler vehicles bearing their distinctive yellow number plates, together with tire-burning, hurling Molotov cocktails and setting up roadblocks. The then Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin's policy was that, "rioters must emerge with casualties or scars." The juxtaposition of this primitive method with Israeli power was striking, with children and youths throwing stones and deploying slingshots against a fully equipped and highly trained military power exerting overwhelming superiority.

The whizkid insisted on gutting the article. Nableezy said it needed significant reduction. I complied with the second request, and version B is the result. I regarded that whole slimming down exercise as damaging to a comprehensive overview, and the length objection as pretextual. But I did what was asked of me. And B is the result of the collateral damage in cutting out the very basics which were provided in version A. At this point, using the example of B to challenge the coverage of narrative bias and get that even thinner, seems completely crazy to me, and just kicks in with the earlier desire for the article to go on a radical narrative diet (and repress the factual record). Nishidani (talk) 11:17, 9 March 2021 (UTC)

Suggestion for second paragraph of introduction

Second paragraph of the introduction currently states: "Public discussion of the occupation is also contested, especially on university campuses." It goes on to mention and cite issues on college campuses, not mentioning where the college campuses are. The cited sources all seem to be USA-specific. So my suggestion is to change that to something like "Public discussion of the occupation is also contested, especially on American university campuses." or something like that. Or, if the issue is more global, then some non-US sources should be added. Macoroni (talk) 15:03, 12 May 2021 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 14 May 2021

Naolieb (talk) 21:06, 14 May 2021 (UTC)

Naolieb (talk) 21:06, 14 May 2021 (UTC)This information is tricky and antisemitic, this is really wrong information, the land that all the Jewish ""occupied"" has been bought for lots of people Naolieb (talk) 21:06, 14 May 2021 (UTC)

 Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. Please mention the particular section you are referring to. ― Qwerfjkl  (please use {{reply to|Qwerfjkl}} on reply) 21:54, 14 May 2021 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 20 May 2021

In paragraph 2 of the subsection "Land seizure mechanisms" of the section "Early economic impact of occupation", the link for the settlement of Matitiyahu redirects to the page for the priest Mattathias ben Johanan instead of the page for the Israeli settlement of Matityahu. Please change this link so that it redirects to Matityahu, Mateh Binyamin instead of Mattathias ben Johanan. Freedom4U (talk) 01:05, 20 May 2021 (UTC)

fixed, thank you, nableezy - 03:16, 20 May 2021 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 21 August 2021

In section "The language of conflict and coverage in academia and the media", paragraph three, sentence three, change "that"the" to "that "the". There is currently no space between the two words. Thank you! Johnsoneill (talk) 20:49, 21 August 2021 (UTC)

and  Done, thank you. Selfstudier (talk) 21:24, 21 August 2021 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 21 August 2021

In section "Early economic impact of occupation", first paragraph, final sentence, the sentence ends with a comma instead of a period. Thank you! Johnsoneill (talk) 18:20, 26 August 2021 (UTC)

 Done ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 18:25, 26 August 2021 (UTC)

Question about the following sentence in "The language of conflict and coverage in academia and the media" paragraph

In the paragraph cited above, one finds the following sentence:

International usage speaks of the West Bank, whereas Israeli usage prefers Judea and Samaria; the IDF "says" or "confirms" while Palestinians "claim"; for Israelis, violence is an interruption of the status quo, for Palestinians it is an everyday feature of the occupation; what Palestinians and the international community generally consider to be targeted assassinations are "pinpoint preventive operations" for Israel; what some call "colonies" are called "settlements" or "neighbourhoods" by others; what some call "displacement" is for Palestinians "dispossession".

So far as I can tell, no sources are cited in support of this sentence; Bishara (2008) - cited in support of the sentence before this one - does not appear to support this series of assertions, nor, so far as I can tell, does Tiripelli (2016) 24, the main source invoked in the note to the sentence following this one. Might I kindly ask for clarity regarding which source is meant to be cited in support of this series of assertions? With thanks, Publius In The 21st Century (talk) 03:51, 5 September 2021 (UTC)

At a quick glance, most of this material (which seems true but old) is mentioned and cited in Media coverage of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Pinging @Nishidani:, I think he knows about this stuff, he might clarify things.Selfstudier (talk) 09:37, 5 September 2021 (UTC)

A major editwarrior wanted the original pared down to less than half. I met him half-way, and split off large amounts of material, where each remaining section here will find complete documented coverage for every claim, in the relevant sister-articles. Of course, rather than synthesize Media coverage of the Arab–Israeli conflict here, I could take back holus bolus all of the sources there, and bloat the article again. I though that was the function of having a main article link. I you want by all means go to the main article, check through the references and bring them here where you think the documentation is inadequate. Nishidani (talk) 11:58, 5 September 2021 (UTC)

I appreciate that this article has a history, and I have absolutely no doubt that, unfortunately, it is a very contentious one. Presumably that doesn't change the fact, however, that the onus is on the editor who adds the text to include citations when necessary, though I am also aware that you are a considerably more experienced editor than I am and no doubt have a more intimate knowledge of the nuances of these procedures. On that basis, and since I am here to make the encyclopedia better and not simply to be difficult, I am happy in this case to go the extra step of having a look at the page you suggest.

a. The first relevant claim I encountered on the "main page" was as follows: In Israeli newspaper reportage of violence, the IDF confirms, or says, while the Palestinians claim.[14] Speaking for myself, when I came to the "Occupation" article under discussion, I took the clause "the IDF 'says' or 'confirms' while Palestinians 'claim'" to be a claim about "International usage", the main subject of the first clause; as the sentence now stands (and given the heading of the section), it is unclear what else could be meant. Fortunately, it seems there there is a quick fix here, namely, putting the originally sentence in in full and adding the appropriate citation after the semi-colon. Adding the necessary citations after semi-colons - here and for the whole sequence of claims - would hardly bloat much of anything, I would have thought?

b. The process of condensing a larger article seems to have produced other infelicities. For example, the heading of the section is "The language of conflict and coverage in academia and the media". But where in the sentence "for Israelis, violence is an interruption of the status quo, for Palestinians it is an everyday feature of the occupation" is there a claim about language or coverage? Presumably such an assertion might belong in a section called "the phenomenology of occupation" or the like, but I cannot see how it belongs here as things now stand.

c. There is also, I think, a rather more serious concern, which has to do with NPOV. Consider the following paragraph as it now stands, and how easy it would be to replace the original words with those in square brackets:

The way the conflict is reported are extensively monitoring and analysed: in addition to Israel's [pro-Palestinian] public diplomacy, intent on countering negative press images, there are also many private pro-Israeli organizations [pro-Palestinian organizations and writers], among them CAMERA, FLAME, HonestReporting, Palestinian Media Watch, Canary Mission and the Anti-Defamation League [the Electronic Intifada, mondoweiss.net, the 972, the Council for American-Islamic Relations, the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, Students for Justice in Palestine, Mearsheim & Walt, Robert Fisk] which claim much reportage is distorted. The term Pallywood [The Israel lobby] was coined to suggest that Palestinian coverage of their plight is manipulative fake news [Israel controls the American media narrative]. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt [Manfred Gerstenfeld and Ben Green] have argued that United States [British and European] media coverage, compared to other countries, tilts strongly in Israel's [the Palestinians'] favour.[l] This view that American [European] media are biased against Palestinians [Israelis] has been challenged by authors who cite research that concluded most mainstream media [mainstream American media] have a "liberal" [pro-Jewish] bias, a criticism extended to European outlets like Le Monde and the BBC.[34]

Quite a different take! No wonder they do all that discourse analysis of media on the Arab-Israeli conflict....Fortunately, I think this is probably quite easy to fix, too, and I bet we could improve things quite a lot in one or two iterations - with your permission, might I give it a go? (Yes, I understand that people here may think that the Israelis and pro-Israel Americans are wrong that the media is against them - and of course that is one of the more maddening ironies of the Arab-Israeli conflict: that every party feels "the media" is biased against them. So presumably we can do the Wikipedia thing and write it in NPOV. Again, veteran editors like those here don't need me to tell them anything about this...)

Finally, it seems the section should really be titled something like "The language of conflict and coverage in the American & Israeli (and maybe British) media. Consider, for example, that there is no discussion of media discourse on the conflict in Germany, or other E.U. countries (Le Monde does makes a brief appearance), not to mention in Egypt, say, or Syria, or Iran, or in Al-Jazeera. I can't imagine anyone suggesting these are not important, and fortunately, plenty of analysis has been devoted to these topics, too.

In short, I propose that we:

1. should do the quick fix in a);

2. either I) change the heading of the section to include claims that are not about language or media coverage or II) remove claims that are not about language or media coverage;

3. either I) specify that really only American and Israeli, or American, Israeli and maybe British, media are meant or II) provide media analyses addressing a broader set of countries/discourses;

4. take a slightly more mature approach, one that a) acknowledges that a defining part of the conflict is the sense on all sides that they are the ones getting the raw deal, and that the conflict over how the conflict is presented and conceptualized is itself a crucial part of the conflict, and b) with this self-reflexiveness in hand, tries to limit, rather than expand, Wikipedia as a theater in precisely this conflict by being a little more balanced.

I appreciate that some of these points might well be discussed at the main "Media Coverage" page, and I'd be happy to make those points there, too; I can see that it isn't only this page which bears the scars of this battle. With all best, Publius In The 21st Century (talk) 20:57, 5 September 2021 (UTC)

I'll look into this over the next few days. Perhaps going back to the original version and checking it against what we have now, I will find one or two imprecisions in paraphrase. But, as a principle, I never add anything to Wikipedia which is not based on a careful paraphrase, source after source. What the sources say determines the text, not what our POVs desire. Some time ago, I read Donna Robinson Divine's'Word Crimes: Reclaiming The Language of The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,' Israel Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2, Summer 2019 pp. 1-16, and mulled whether to use it, despite my own impression it was execrably slipshod (all rhetoric, no substance, and no familiarity with Israeli scholarship, while pleading for Israel. There was nothing illustrative there I could harvest for the second. Add it if you like.

In any case, if I detect slips, I'll fix them. Euripides has one of his characters say;ἁμαρτεῖν εἰκὸς ἀνθρώπους.Nishidani (talk) 21:47, 5 September 2021 (UTC)

This is the integral version of the sections on media and language before they were hacked and flensed and split off into separate articles. Checking it against the text as it stands now should enable you to find the precise reference for what you say is, at the moment, unreferenced.Nishidani (talk) 07:10, 6 September 2021 (UTC)

I'm sure the Nurse has some fitting remarks, too, for circumstances where one lets a wiki-dialogue hang too long in abeyance; in my own tongue, I can only apologize for the hiatus and say that it may be some time yet before I am able to devote proper attention to Wikipedia. With all my best to you both in the meantime, and apologies once more Publius In The 21st Century (talk) 00:42, 22 September 2021 (UTC)

"pinpoint preventive operations" is no longer the fashion (as explained at Media coverage of the Arab–Israeli conflict.Selfstudier (talk) 09:49, 6 September 2021 (UTC)

A small additional note re the above thread

(a)"even today, when post-primary education is neither free nor compulsory, about 92 per cent of the Jewish 14-year-olds are at school (including 27 per cent who are still in primary education) Kleinberger p.196

(b) "School attendance rates per every 1000 Arab adolescents aged 14-17 in 1966/7 were as low as 228 (including 76 in primary education)— as compared with 620 per every 1000 Jews of corresponding age." Kleinberger p.197

There is a slight sleight of hand in comparing Jewish attendance at age 14 with Israeli Arab attendance through 14-17

The proper comparison would be 14-17 for both age groups. Pollak, citing the only data I could find for both groups aged 14-17/18 states that as recently as 1963-64: ‘During the period 1963-64 27 percent of the secondary age group (14-18) attended schools at this (secondary) level. However, 33 percent of this age group where in the primary grades of the schools for “working youth”. Pollak p.20 ( that figure is not classified ethnically, but concerns all Israelis)

There is perhaps no ethnic differential in this, but I don’t think the minor Arab numbers factored in (with growth over 3 years) would dramatically change the implied distinction very high rates of Jewish secondary school attendance vs the 20% attendance of 15-17 year olds. Looks odd to me, but then I’m illiterate in these matters, except to note the source bias in comparing the 14 year olds (Jewish) rate to the 14-17 years old rate (Arab). Nishidani (talk) 17:20, 13 October 2021 (UTC)

This isn't "source bias" in Kleinberger, it's "laziness bias" on my part in not (yet) copying in the data I previously summarized for 14 to 17 year olds, both in aggregate and for each year separately. He has a table with 3x5=15 lines for the 4+1 ages levels and the aggregate, with 3 enrollment percentages for each (primary, post primary, and the sum of both), in the Jewish population, excluding noninspected religious schools which he estimates at 5% to 7.5% additional enrollment. As I said above, for the aggregate this is 67 to 69.5 percent and you can work out from that the all Israel figure is some 55 to 60% and (even if no non Jew ever went to school at all, and excluding 14yo's) over 50 percent, unquestionably above the 45 percent number T and D give for the West Bank, and colossally larger than the misattributed 23 percent (i.e., the Israeli Arab figure as Zero and I have been telling you).

I will add it to the Kleinberger section when I have time to copy in the data, but my summary already is enough to show that interpreting the T+D figures as applying to all Israel is impossible. Which was always obvious from looking at the development/socioeconomic levels of the two places in the 1960s. Sesquivalent (talk) 01:12, 14 October 2021 (UTC)

Also, the import of the Jewish 14yo number is that compulsory eight year education was universal in the Jewish community by the 1960s, and probably much earlier than that apart from some complications with immigrants from the least developed countries; whereas Arabs had a very high rate of early leaving from primary school. This is one reason why your calculations of percentage of students in secondary school does not say much about percentage of residents of the same age who are in school. The denominator is deflated for Arabs by school leaving and disenrollment of girls, and for Jews inflated by the immigration. Sesquivalent (talk) 01:34, 14 October 2021 (UTC)

Rates of post-primary schooling per every 100 boys and girls aged 14-17+ in 1965/6 were 28 in development towns as against 50 on the national average.Kleiberger 1969 p.283Nishidani (talk) 16:59, 15 October 2021 (UTC)